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1. Introduction 
The economic miracle of China is today a matter of fact. The last four decades of 
persistent high economic growth is the result of moving from a planned economy towards a 
socialist-market economy. The decentralization of fiscal governance has been a major market 
reform that has contributed substantially to China´s economic growth (Montinola, Qian & 
Weingast, 1996, Lin & Liu, 2000; Ding, McQuoid & Karayalcin, 2015). However, economic 
development has also given rise to environmental degradation. Rapid industrialization is 
related to higher energy demand. This, in turn increases CO2 emissions that affect global 
warming and therefore human wellbeing. China is currently the world´s largest CO2 emitting 
country (Liu, 2015; EIA, 2016), and has drawn attention from the international community to 
see if it can fulfil the commitment of stabilizing CO2 emission levels. It is widely 
acknowledged that an initial stage of economic development is associated with increasing 
CO2 emissions1. However, it is less clear to what extent a decentralized fiscal system with 
subnational governments in charge of the local economy affects CO2 performance.  
 
Fiscal federalism can be viewed as the way decision-making power is divided between of 
national government (NG) and subnational government (SNG) and how these levels of 
government interact with each other (Rosen & Gayer, 2014). This study assumes the former 
aspect to be exogenously given but the latter to be endogenous such that inter-jurisdictional 
competition affects environmental performance. Economic theory and previous studies 
highlight both advantages and disadvantages regarding fiscal and environmental federalism. 
As for advantages, local government has information advantages regarding local preferences, 
which favours decentralized authority (Hayek, 1945). Moreover, in order to attract capital and 
labor, local governments tend to compete against each other by sensible taxation and improve 
the management of public services (Tiebout, 1956). The inter-jurisdictional competition in 
China serves a critical role in limiting the discretionary authority of central and local 
governments. This is instituted by the central government granting authority to lower 
governments while enforcing the system by the central protection of free capital mobility 
between jurisdictions (Montinola, Qian & Weingast, 1996). Therefore, decentralized 
competition further enhances the efficiency in providing public goods because of the 
incentives to act according to local needs (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Eichenberger, 1994). 
This includes efforts to protect the environment (Millimet, 2014). The advantages of fiscal 
federalism is also supported by Musgrave (1959) who states that public efficiency improves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is in line with the theory of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) established by Simon Kuznets. For 
further study, see Kuznets (1955) and Stern (2003).  
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when central government controls redistribution of income and local governments decide how 
to allocate public resources.  
 
A main critique for the above stated advantages is the biased incentive structure among local 
officials. In China, especially in poor regions, upward promotion of local officials within the 
political hierarchy depends on maximizing economic growth as a signal of achievements 
(Zhang et al, 2015). This promotion system is prioritized at the expense of environmental 
degradation (Jia, 2012). Furthermore, inter-jurisdictional competition forces poor local 
governments to ease environmental standards and lower tax levels in order to attract 
investments and labour. This causes a race to the bottom where competition for economic 
development between jurisdictions leads to underfinanced public services that are lower than 
the social optimum (Oates, 1999). Local governments thus become financially constrained to 
invest in environmental protection. The race to the bottom may be especially prominent 
among poor regions due to lower levels of human capital and public infrastructure. The role 
of decentralization becomes contradictory because environmental regulations are eased in 
favour of maximizing economic growth. 
There are major fiscal disparities between provinces in China. Poor provinces tend to rely 
more on central transfers to finance local public services than rich provinces (Shen, Jin & 
Zou, 2012; Naughton, 2007). Since economic development is highly diverse between regions, 
major differences in CO2 emissions also exist between provinces (Liu, 2016; Zheng et al, 
2014). 
1.1 Research question 
Even though early economic theory states decentralization to be more socially optimal, 
disadvantages still remains in the form of biased incentive structures and environmental 
externalities. In fact, a number of studies in the U.S. (Banzhaf & Chuff, 2012) and globally 
(Farzanegan & Mennel, 2005; Sigman, 2006) suggest decentralized environmental 
governance is less cost-efficient when it comes to pollution abatements. Nevertheless, studies 
that focus on China suggest there are positive effects between fiscal federalism and the 
spending in pollution abatements (He, 2015; Kang, 2016). Thus, previous studies indicate 
mixed results regarding how environmental efforts resulting from fiscal decentralization 
affect environmental performance, not to mention that none of these studies examined the 
particular relationship between fiscal federalism and CO2 emissions. Therefore, this study 
researches how fiscal decentralization affects the intensity of CO2 emissions on provincial 
levels in China by asking the following question: How do the size of budgetary revenues, 
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expenditures and deficits affect CO2 emissions among provinces in China? This study 
considers CO2 emission levels to be influenced by the size of decentralized fiscal 
management, reflected by budgetary revenues, expenditures and deficits. The thesis simply 
presumes that inter-provincial fiscal competition determines the size of provincial budgets. 
The study aims to find out whether decentralized fiscal responsibilities strengthen China’s 
attempt to fulfil its commitments of stabilizing CO2 emissions. From the perspective of fiscal 
federalism, the study seeks to answer whether decentralized authority should be viewed as an 
“environmental helping hand” or rather as a hindrance. From the perspective of CO2 
emissions, the results of this study may shed new light on how the built-up institutional 
framework of Chinese fiscal federalism can determine outcomes of environmental 
performance.  
1.2 Data and Methods 
The empirical analysis in this study relies on panel data of 30 provinces in China from 
2003 to 2015. The use of panel data has several favourable aspects. The advantages include 
better correction for heterogeneity between observations, more variability that improves 
efficiency of estimations and greater opportunities to analyse dynamic effects (Kennedy, 
2008). Provincial budgetary revenues and expenditures represent proxies of fiscal 
decentralization and were retrieved from a variety of China Statistical Yearbooks. The study 
calculates CO2 emissions by using energy consumption levels multiplied by updated emission 
factors established by Liu et al (2015). The utilized emission factors reveal more accurate 
measurements based on sample results from China’s energy consumption than do the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) standard measures (Shan et al, 2016). 
Data for energy consumption are retrieved from China Energy Statistical Yearbooks.  
1.3 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations concerning the data used. Most importantly, the 
reliability of Chinese official macro-level data remains a disputed subject, especially data 
concerning economic activity (see Holtz, 2003; Sinclair, 2012). Even though data might be 
underreported, there is still no reason to believe that incentives vary between local statistical 
bureaus. Thus, differences in cross-section and time series should still remain robust. A 
second limitation is related to the exclusion of four provinces due to lack of observations. A 
third limitation is that the data are restricted to the years of 2003-2015. The reason for this 
restriction is not only due to lack of data, but also because energy statistics are suspected to be 
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biased between 1996-2002 due to underreported coal consumption2. Finally, the study is 
limited in that it accounts for aggregate budgetary expenditures without dividing into 
environmental and non-environmental expenditure sources. The reason to this is also due to 
lack of data. 
1.4 Disposition 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 outlays a theoretical 
background that describes the major economic arguments for fiscal federalism. The chapter 
also examines necessary institutional conditions, local incentive structures, and the 
environmental outcome of inter-jurisdictional competition. Chapter 3 explains the Chinese 
evolution of fiscal federalism and interprovincial competition, the risk of racing to the bottom 
and how this ties to the environmental performance, measured by CO2 emissions. Chapter 4 
presents the empirical methods, regression results, robustness checks and discussion of 
results. Chapter 5 finally concludes.   
 
2. Theoretical framework of federalism 
Before starting to examine how outcomes of decentralized fiscal responsibilities affect 
CO2 emissions in China, this chapter will first highlight the basic economic arguments behind 
fiscal federalism. In line with Siebert (2008), this study assumes public goods account for 
efforts to protect the environment and therefore affect CO2 emissions.  
2.1 Theory of fiscal federalism 
Fiscal federalism is defined as the scope of decision-making fiscal authority allocated 
between NG and SNGs and the interaction between government levels (Rosen & Gayer, 
2014). The economic theory of fiscal federalism addresses the effects of decentralized fiscal 
management from both efficiency and equity points of view. Within the theory, it is generally 
stated that the central government should stabilize the macroeconomic variables that have 
national impacts, such as inflation, interest rates and income distribution, while the local 
governments are in charge of public goods that benefits the local economy (Ibid; Musgrave, 
1959; Ferreira et al, 2005). The primary goal of decentralization is to improve social welfare, 
which includes protection of the local environment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Potential reasons to this relate to the adaption of a new statistical system in 1998 and the abandon of small-
scale unlicensed coalmines that resulted in underreported energy usage (Naughton, 2007; Peters, Weber, Guan & 
Hubacek, 2008).  	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The idea of improving social welfare by decentralizing public authority was first 
proposed by Hayek (1945) who pointed out that SNGs have local information advantages. In 
other words, the production of local public services better reflects the preferences of the 
people concerned when decision-making power is locally exercised instead of centrally 
governed. Tiebout (1956) further extended Hayek’s arguments of favouring decentralized 
authorities by explaining the role of inter-jurisdictional competition. Based on the assumption 
that mobile capital moves freely between jurisdictions, Tiebout argued that inter-jurisdictional 
competition inevitably forces SNGs to improve the quality of public goods and apply sensible 
tax rates. As mobile capital and labor freely move in and out of communities, local 
governments have the task of optimizing the number of residents in accordance with the local 
public interests. In contrast to a national authority system, the subnational decision-making 
authority represents an incentive-based institutional framework that enables SNGs to match 
local public goods with the preferences of mobile labor, which we call consumer-voters. From 
an environmental perspective, when consumer-voters demand clean environments, the theory 
suggests that decentralized fiscal governance outperforms centralized governance in 
providing for these services. 
In sum, by viewing environmental protection as a public good, the basic theory of fiscal 
federalism states the following: First, initial environmental conditions vary between local 
jurisdictions. Secondly, nobody is more concerned about the local environment than the local 
people it affects. Lastly, no other governments have more incentives to take measures against 
environmental degradation than local governments.  
2.2 Government incentive structure and hard budget constraints 
The theory stated above assumes that local leaders are incentivized to act according to 
peoples’ preferences without being punished if acting on their own discretion. However, this 
study assumes that governments do not act benevolently without first being incentivized to 
serve the people. Also, the study assumes that governments do not manage fiscal assignments 
responsibly if not being forced to do so. Therefore, this section examines important conditions 
for SNG incentives not to be biased and for sub-national competition to remain durable. 
 
The political structure among some developing countries, including China, deviates from 
the West. For instance, government decentralization in western countries has taken place at an 
earlier stage and their democratic system acts as a mechanism of trust between the people and 
the government. Since common indicators of democracy are rather weak within the Chinese 
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Communist Party, political trust has to be found through other sources in order for federalism 
to be sustained.  Montinola et al (1996) state that political trust is embedded within the 
structure of a decentralized system itself. The allocation of authority into national and 
subnational levels coupled with their complementary responsibilities creates a mechanism of 
mutual dependency necessary to maintain a decentralized system. Therefore, instead of 
depending on trust between government and the people, a decentralized system relies on trust 
between national and subnational governors.  
From a national perspective, the central government supports the role of local governance 
simply because of their information advantages and inter-jurisdictional competition that 
fosters economic prosperity. At the same time, local governments rely on the central 
government for protecting competition and eliminating attempts to set up trade barriers. Thus, 
one level of government carries interests of another level and strives to preserve rather than 
reverse the framework of allocated authority. Although major democratic institutions are 
absent in China, the division of political power through federalism forms an institution itself 
that is sufficiently credible to act as a foundation for market development (Jin et al, 2005). 
The interdependency between governments adds a new dimension of durability built into the 
system.  
Apart from that responsibilities assigned between SNGs and NG have to complement 
each other; another important condition for federalism to be effective is that all levels of 
government have to operate under hard budget constraints to limit the amount of transfers and 
loans between jurisdictions (Montinola et al, 1996; World Bank, 2000). The condition of hard 
budget constraints is vital in order to maintain inter-jurisdictional competition. It signals that 
SNGs have to bear the costs and the benefits resulting from their fiscal management. For 
instance, if one SNG makes no effort to tax activities causing environmental damages, it 
cannot expect transfers of environmental investments from another jurisdiction. In order to 
protect the incentive structure for inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition, it is required that 
central government withholds subsidies and bailouts to local financial institutions and that 
SNGs eliminate fiscal transfers between jurisdictions.  
In sum, fiscal federalism is durable for any country independent of democracy if the 
assigned authorities to NG and SNGs are interdependent. The hard budget constraint is a 
necessary condition in order to incentivize SNGs to responsibly manage fiscal assignments. 
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2.3 Inter-jurisdictional competition 
Moving towards the environmental outcomes of fiscal federalism, this section identifies 
the strategies SNGs use to compete for mobile capital and how they impact protection of the 
environment.   
Aligned with Tiebout’s established theory about inter-provincial competition, SNGs 
compete for mobile resources in three ways (Ferreira et al, 2005): First, SNGs compete in 
providing public goods by creating attractive environments for their residents and firms, and 
optimize their value of public service with limited fiscal budgets. Because fiscal competition 
takes local preferences into account, public goods are produced and provided more efficiently. 
Second, SNGs compete for tax revenues that are necessary to finance public goods. The 
revenue competition acts as an incentive for sensible taxation of peoples’ incomes and 
business. Third, SNGs compete for national and foreign investments by easing regulations 
such as environmental standards to reduce production costs for firms. The three competition 
strategies create a variety of policies by which some SNGs manage to increase their budget 
revenues through capital inflow while other SNGs fail to compete and experience capital 
outflow. In other words, inter-jurisdictional competition creates both winners and losers. It 
removes the ability of the losing SNG to improve its tax base while still requiring it to protect 
the environment.   
 
A major critique for inter-jurisdictional competition to protect the environment targets the 
competition process. In this scenario, local governments strive to attract mobile capital such 
as labour and business investments by setting tax rates under their competitors. When 
government players respond to changes in tax rates, the competition leads towards a race to 
the bottom and results in insufficient tax revenues (Oates, 1999). Because of low tax rates on 
mobile capital, local governments struggle to finance public services, which therefore become 
underprovided (Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1984) The constrained budget balance consequently 
forces SNGs to limit the amount of public investment in environment protection and thus 
lowers their efforts of reducing CO2 emissions. This suggests that SNGs that are fiscally 
constrained because of losing mobile capital tax revenues are more likely to have higher 
emission levels than SNGs with high tax revenues.  
2.4 Environmental federalism 
The theory of environmental federalism roots in Tiebout’s argument that decentralized 
public authorities improve the provision of public goods through competition and attention to 
local preferences. However, positive outcomes of decentralized environmental authority often 
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backfire because of their weak assumptions. Excluding any assumption causes decentralized 
management to distort consumer-voter preferences and results in environmental degradation. 
One example is the environmental effect of federalism modelled by Oates and Schwab 
(1988). Although the model reveals positive effects, it relies on several controversial 
assumptions.  For instance, the model assumes that all community residents are homogeneous 
and that no pollution spillover effect exists between communities. Several scholars criticize 
the assumption of perfect information among consumer-voters regarding public goods (Oates, 
1981; Bewley, 1981; Oakland, 1987). For instance, it is likely that information about 
environmental conditions among residents is imperfect and consumer-voters therefore signal 
biased preferences to SNGs. This leads SNGs to misjudge the actual state of the environment 
and in turn affects new environmental targets in future policies.  
Focusing on the spillover effects; cost of pollutants, such as CO2 emissions, do not 
always coincide with the time and place it was emitted. In such scenarios, polluters subjected 
to CO2 emissions do not pay the full cost because of negative externalities. The fact that 
provincial CO2 emissions affect global warming suggests that large spillover effects exist 
between provinces. Therefore, the absence of unified environmental standards limits central 
government’s ability to stop local governments from easing regulations of CO2 emissions in 
favour of capital inflow. Not only tax rates but also low environmental standards serve as 
tools for racing to the bottom. Regions risk turning into pollution havens by ignoring the costs 
of compensation for spillover effects.   
 
3. The evolution of fiscal federalism in China   
China started its economic and fiscal reforms by the opening up in 1978. The central 
government began to gradually decentralize authority top-down to lower levels of government 
as local people increasingly were acting according to local advantages. These local market-
like activities evolved in a bottom-up effect so strong that it fundamentally changed the 
direction of central government decision-making. While decentralization in China certainly 
created advantages in the overall governance system, it still has several environmental 
drawbacks, as we shall discover.  
3.1 Pre 1994 
China began to decentralize fiscal governance in 1984 by issuing the “fiscal contracting 
system” (FCS), which divided national government into categories of central, provincial, 
municipal, county and township levels (Lou, 2009). The fiscal system transformed from 
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wholly controlled and discretion-based by the centre into a share-based revenue system in 
which local government retained part of the revenues previously remitted to the center based 
on negotiated contracts (Ma, 1995). The FCS aimed to give local governments more secure 
sources of revenues and to enable flexible decision-making of local public spending (Tsui & 
Wang, 2004). Lower-level government contracted the upper-level regarding shares of 
revenues and profits remitted to the center for a period of five years and retained what was 
left (Montinola et al, 1996; Ma, 1996). As a result, SNGs increased their fiscal autonomy and 
paved the way for market development to expand (Wei, 1996). The fact that local public 
spending primarily targeted economic growth rather than environment protection suggests 
that decentralized public responsibilities initially had low significant impact on local 
environmental management. 
Overall, the FCS disfavoured the local government by being discretion-based with a lack 
of credible commitments from the central government. Established fiscal contracts were often 
revised even before the contracts expired. Therefore, local governments tried to find 
exemptions for not paying tax remittances (Ma, 1995). SNGs expanded their off-budget 
revenues that were excluded from the contracted remittances (World Bank, 1994), and cut 
local tax levels in favour of attracting mobile capital, which resulted in decreased central 
revenue share (Lou, 2009). The share of public spending to GDP decreased and acted as a 
constraint for the central government to manage macroeconomic control (Wang, 1997). The 
declined share of public spending also limited the central government’s ability to uphold 
environmental control through public intervention. The FCS resulted in fiscal disparity with 
unequal levels of shared taxes between provinces (Jin, Qian & Weingast, 2005). The irregular 
revenue and expenditure contracts between provinces and the evolving off-budgetary funds 
led to differentiation in local spending that affected regional development and enlarged the 
economic diversity (Wei, 1996). Central government had to develop new institutions that 
were able to clarify fiscal responsibilities and to protect autonomous authorities from being 
altered while still benefiting all groups of interests. It had to restore the inter-provincial fiscal 
disparities in order for underdeveloped provinces to manage the burden of expenditure 
responsibilities. 
3.2 Post 1994 
As a response to the weakened central fiscal position, the central government 
completely revised the FCS in 1994 into a “tax sharing system” (TSS). The new system aimed 
to change the government decision-making from being discretion-based to become rule-based 
and nationally unified without opportunities to negotiate remittances (Wang, 1997). Apart 
	  	   14	  
from reinforced institutional quality, the TSS especially intended to increase total revenues as 
a share of GDP and central revenues as a share of total revenues (Wong, 2013; Niu, 2013; 
Hussain & Stern, 2009). 	  
In contrast to the FCS, the TSS distinctively allocated fiscal responsibilities between 
NG and SNGs, which helped improve the efficiency of government administration. The 
institutional framework built into the TSS enhanced the credibility of government 
commitments and made reforms durable enough to empower economic actors to engage in 
long-term investments (Montinola et al, 1996). The ratio of public sector to GDP and central 
to local revenues regained power (Dollar & Hofman, 2009; Lam & Wingender, 2015). In fact, 
total fiscal revenues to GDP increased from 10.5 percent in 1994 to 20.1 percent in 2015 
(State Administration of Taxation of PRC, 2015).  
However, while the reform kept expenditure responsibilities decentralized, it rapidly 
recentralized the revenue side (Wong, 2013; Niu, 2013). Consequently, local budget deficits 
increased and added greater dependency on central transfers (Kamp et al, 2017). The unequal 
fiscal balance gave central government a stronger bargaining position (Naughton, 2007). 
Thus, even though the structure of authority within TSS helped improve institutional quality, 
it reversed the balance of fiscal power to favour the central government and in turn increased 
the risk of discretion-based governance. While the local share of revenues grew modestly, the 
local expenditure burden trumped revenues significantly and the gap between the two has 
increased over time (Asian Development Bank, 2014). Figure 1 below illustrates the growing 
fiscal gap between NG and SNGs. In fact, until today all provinces are burdened with net 
budget deficits (China Statistical Yearbook 2016). Such circumstances constrain provincial 
governments to finance public goods, including the management of environmental protection. 
Any attempts by the central government to compensate fiscal deficits through transfers remain 
inefficient due to difficulties in monitoring and securing the use of earmarked transfers. 
 
Figure 1 Vertical imbalance of fiscal budgets. Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2016. Compiled by 
author. 
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Nevertheless, the fiscal federalism in China indicates that public actors are competitive 
and still interdependent. However, despite of fostering the overall economic development, 
decentralization increased the fiscal diversity between provinces and made poor SNGs 
relatively more dependent on central transfers, which can be used discretionary. These factors 
suggest that fiscal federalism in China detracts environmental protection relatively more for 
poor provinces that are fiscally constrained.        
3.3 Incentive structure for local environmental effort 
The relationship between central and local governments is sensitive to the choice of 
policy and eagerness for promoting economic development on the local level. This section 
focuses on the provincial government effort to protect the environment by looking at the 
expenditure side and assumes that provincial leaders are as much profit-maximisers as central 
leaders.   
A province with low expenditures due to low revenue income is especially reliant on 
central government transfers to meet national public standards (Shen, Jin & Zou, 2012). On 
the contrary, the central-to-local transfers signal less pressure for local government to take 
self-responsible fiscal decisions (Oates, 1999). In other words, there is a risk that transfers are 
used as bailouts and act as soft budget constraints that loose discipline among local governors 
to execute central environmental orders. As long as local government primarily has authority 
over the local economy, central government cannot self-steer local government efforts but 
only influence them by using the retention rate of local revenues (Jin, Qian & Weingast, 
2005). Because we suspect provinces with large fiscal deficits to rely more on central 
transfers suggest that financially constrained provinces are less incentivised to make efforts in 
developing the local economy and comply with national environmental standards. In fact, 
previous studies found provinces with high fiscal imbalance act strategically in setting their 
environmental stringency and being more energy intensive (Xiong, 2012)     
3.4 Economic growth versus environmental protection 
In the initial state of development, China decentralized fiscal authority primarily to 
stimulate economic growth rather than to protect the environment (Fu, 2008; He et al, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the central government obligates provincial government to implement 
environmental regulations in order to meet pollution abatement targets (Huang & Xia, 2016). 
Central government even appoints provincial leaders instead of being elected by the local 
people, which means that the central political agenda should determine the direction of local 
management rather than local preferences (Wang, 2012).  
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However, although central government tries to steer the spending way of local finance 
through central transfers, they fail in tying together earmarked fiscal resources with 
environmental responsibilities (Kamp et al, 2017). This raises a question of what cause 
centrally issued environment standards to be undermined by its self-appointed provincial 
government? The answer to this question relates to the performance-based promotion system 
of political leaders. This system rewards government officials to climb up in the political 
hierarchy depending on economic growth achievements despite its environmental impacts 
(Jia, 2012). Provincial leaders that achieve higher growth hold an advantage when competing 
for promotion. In addition, China lacks the law enforcement for punishing local leaders that 
disregards compliance of environmental standards.  
Thus, even though guidelines are issued from top-down level, the environmental 
protection bureaus (EPBs) still rely on local government finances and become subject to local 
public interests (Wielens, 2008). The local self-centred strive for economic growth distorts 
EPBs initial purpose given by the central government to act independently regardless of local 
political interests. That said, local governments hold some degree of interest to lower 
pollution levels by subsidizing firms for abatement efforts and can also receive parts of 
central revenues from emission permits if certain conditions are fulfilled (Chen & 
Groenewold, 2015).  
The question, though, is which of the economic and environmental effect that dominates 
the other and whether a province has reached a sufficient development stage to shift focus 
from economic quantity to economic quality. Until now, the signal of economic growth for 
political promotion has outcompeted environmental concerns.  In line with Xiong (2012), this 
study argues that the signal for economic growth is especially prominent among provinces 
with high deficits. These provinces are more likely to act strategically by lowering 
environmental stringency in order to speed up economic growth.  
3.5 Inter-provincial competition in China  
Inter-jurisdictional competition is thought to develop into an effective instrument for 
improving public goods and government policies that previously lacked efficiency (Feng et al, 
2013). However, fiscal competition in China has both winners and losers. Excessive use of 
the two main competitive instruments (public expenditure levels and tax reduction on mobile 
capital) destabilizes the system. It is found that east-coastal regions lower their tax rates in 
order to attract business investments and to out-compete regions in the central-west, which 
evolve in a race to the bottom (Yao & Zhang, 2008). Provinces in the central-west have 
limited sources of fiscal revenues and lower quality of public service. These circumstances 
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force central-west governments to raise the tax rates, which leads to outflow of business 
investment and further decrease revenues and constrain the budget balance of poor provinces. 
In the long run, the continuous shrinking tax base becomes unsustainable for poor 
governments and widens the fiscal gap to the rich. In response, poor governments increase 
their fiscal deficits and deregulate environmental standards in order to attract business 
investments.   
In line with Renard and Xiong (2012), this study suggests fiscally constrained 
governments to act strategically in setting the degree of environmental stringency by the 
following scenario: Poor provinces with small share of mobile tax base likely encounters 
greater fiscal imbalances and consequently respond by easing environmental regulations to 
attract investments. This leads to higher emission levels. In addition, because fiscally 
constrained provinces struggle to finance basic public services, we suspect these provinces to 
undermine investments in environmental protection. This acts as a second effect of higher 
CO2 emission levels. The fiscal situation, which includes revenues, expenditures and deficits, 
leads the study to test for each variable separately by the following three hypotheses: 
 
1. H0: Provinces with lower budget revenues per gross regional product have higher CO2 
emissions per gross regional product. 
 
2. H0: Provinces with lower budget expenditures per gross regional product have higher 
CO2 emissions per gross regional product. 
 
3. H0: Provinces with higher budget deficits per gross regional product have higher CO2 
emissions per gross regional product. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data 
This study uses panel data retrieved from various China Statistical Yearbooks, covering 
30 Chinese provinces between 2003-2015. In order to avoid any inconsistencies when 
modelling, the cross-section and time series data of this study are complete datasets. 
Therefore the data exclude Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Tibet as well as the years of 
observation before 2003 due to limited data access. By limiting the number of provinces and 
years of observations, the dataset becomes more balanced with complete information for each 
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variable. This increases efficiency that would otherwise be lost due to excluded observations 
and, more importantly, lowers the risk of selection bias (Verbeek, 2012).  
The quality of the data from various China Statistical Yearbooks, especially GDP growth, 
remains a topic of debate regarding inaccuracy and manipulation. However, the methods for 
local agencies to collect data have improved significantly over time by implementing unified 
international standards (Koch-Weser, 2013). More recent tests of GDP statistics confirm that 
data are more reliable than critics suggest when considering the complexity of the scope of 
administration (Holz, 2014). No indicators found suggest any potential biased variables to 
vary over time or between provinces. Thus, even if biasedness of the overall data potentially 
exists, this does not change the significance of the relationship, which is of more interest as 
the study focuses on the direction of relationships rather than their absolute values.  
4.2 Variables 
Dependent Variable 
This study investigates the relationship between the fiscal situation and environmental 
pollution on provincial level by focusing on CO2 emissions. The choice of using CO2 
emissions in favour of other commonly used environmental proxies, such as sulphur dioxide, 
solid waste and wastewater (see He, 2015), relates to several environmental factors. First, not 
only has the increase of CO2 emissions in China caused local environmental degradation but it 
has also significantly contributed to global warming, as China is the largest CO2 contributor 
in the world (Chen & Groenewold, 2015). As economic growth remains high, the problem of 
high CO2 emissions should be counteracted immediately. Second, China’s promise of 
reducing CO2 intensity between 2005 and 2020 by 40 percent presumes that provincial 
governments should improve the management of environmental protection.  
Until today, there have been no recordings of CO2 emissions on the provincial level in 
China’s Environmental Statistical Yearbooks. Therefore, this study calculates CO2 emissions 
independently by using consumption of main energy sources multiplied by emission factors 
produced by Shan et al (2016). Energy sources include coal, crude oil and gas. In contrast to 
the commonly used Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) standard measures, 
Shan et al, (2016) argue that the usage of energy improves over time in China and emission 
factors therefore need to be adjusted accordingly. The data of energy sources are retrieved 
from China Energy Statistical Yearbooks source. The study normalizes the dependent variable 
by dividing aggregate provincial CO2 emissions with the gross regional product (GRP) to 
compute what from here on is named as CO2 intensity. The variable can be interpreted as the 
number of CO2 kilos per GRP produced. Since GRP is calculated at current prices, we adjust 
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for inflation by first dividing GRP with provincial indices of GRP at constant prices to 
calculate real GRP. The base year is 2003 and equals 100.  
 
Independent Variables 
The study divides the main explanatory variable, provincial fiscal account, into three 
variables: budget revenues, budget expenditures and budget deficits. These data are retrieved 
from China Statistical Yearbooks. The budget revenues consist of all locally collected 
revenues plus locally shared revenues collected by the central government. Budget 
expenditures refer to provincial public services, and development planned by provincial 
governments (China Statistical Yearbook 2015). Appendix 1 presents a more detailed 
description of the provincial budget components. The budget deficit is calculated as the 
difference between budget expenditures and revenues. In order to adjust for inflation, both 
revenues and expenditures are divided by indices of GRP and then multiplied by the base year 
(=100) in 2003. The study adjusts for provincial variation in size by dividing all three main 
variables by real GRP.      
 
Control Variables 
It is likely that provincial factors beside the fiscal situation also affect CO2 intensity. 
Considering the vast size of China’s population and economy, there exist major economic, 
geographical and socio-economic differences between provinces. In order to isolate the fiscal 
budget effects and for the ceteris paribus condition to hold, the model includes control 
variables for cross-sectional and time differences that potentially affect CO2 intensity3.  
 
GRP per capita and GRP per capita squared 
Because China is still at a development stage, economic growth leads to increased demand in 
energy consumption, which in turn affects environmental quality and causes air pollution 
(World Bank Group, 2016). Empirical studies have found complementary relationships 
between GDP, energy consumption and CO2 emissions on a global level (Saidi & Hammami, 
2015), between developing countries (Niu et al, 2011) as well as within China (Li et al, 2011). 
Furthermore, the study also expects GRP to covariate with the fiscal budget due to the fact 
that higher GRP increases fiscal revenues and that fiscal expenditures boost GRP through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Apart from covariate with the dependent variable, control variables also need to partly covariate with the fiscal 
budget variables. If not, the effect of fiscal budget will remain unchanged. However, the co-variation should still 
be limited in order to avoid multi-correlation within explanatory variables. Further explanation of control 
variables is presented by Verbeek (2012)  
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public investments. Previous studies have found that the level of GRP determines whether the 
relationship between GRP and environmental quality is positive or negative  (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1995). Therefore, we apply the theory of dynamic effects related to the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)4 for the GRP by including an additional variable for 
squared GRP per capita.  
 
Ratio of investments in fixed assets to GRP  
In line with He (2015) the model includes a confounding variable of physical capital 
investment as a share of GRP. The investment ratio indicates how much of GRP is saved for 
investments in further development and how much of GRP goes to final consumption. In the 
short run, a high ratio of investments will likely increase energy demand but in the long run 
reduce CO2 intensity by improving public infrastructure. This study suggests the time series 
of 13 years are sufficiently long and expects a negative relationship between investment ratio 
and CO2 intensity.  
 
Size of passenger and freight traffic per GRP 
The number of civil motor vehicles in China increased from 23.8 to 162.8 million between 
2003 and 2015 (China Statistical Yearbooks 2016). By using energy sources such as oil, the 
passenger and large vehicles contributed substantially to the increases of CO2 emission in 
China (Wang et al, 2010). Similarly, the length of highways has expanded from 1.8 to 4.6 
million kilometres between 2003 and 2015 (Ibid). The variable for passenger traffic-km 
measures the number of passengers multiplied by the number of kilometres. A second 
variable for freight-traffic-km measures the number of freight tons multiplied by the number 
of kilometres. There are two counteractive aspects about the variables. First, higher passenger 
and freight traffic-km indicates a more efficient transport system, which lowers the CO2 
intensity. However, as long as vehicles use oil as combustion, the same increase also leads to 
a higher demand for energy. Thus, the net impact depends on which effect dominates the 
other. Furthermore, we assume that passenger and freight traffic-km covariate with fiscal 
expenditures by being dependent on public investments in infrastructure. Both variables are 
normalized as per GRP values.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
4 For more information about the theory of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), see Kuznets (1955) and Stern 
(2003).	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Human capital per capita 
Provinces in China with higher human capital reveal signs of improved environmental quality 
(Jun, Zhong-kui, & Peng-fei, 2011). It requires some degree of knowledge in order to be 
aware about the long-term consequences of environmental degradation, which is more likely 
to be obtained among highly educated people. This study expects higher environmental 
awareness among residents to change consumer behaviour accordingly and to act pressure on 
decision-making authorities to take stricter measurements. In order to control for human 
capital, we construct a proxy variable measured as the population share of enrolled students 
for higher education. The study assumes that higher student enrolment per capita reflects 
higher provincial human capital on average.   
 
Ratio of secondary industry to GRP 
The dominance of secondary industries is more prominent in provinces with middle-income 
levels. Secondary industry is often related to manufactories and is relatively more energy 
intensive as opposed to tertiary industries. Therefore, this study expects provinces with high 
ratio of secondary industry to GRP covariate with high levels of CO2 intensity.  
 
Model specification 
To test the relationship between CO2 intensity and fiscal situation, the study constructs the 
following base model: 
 1         𝐶𝑂!𝑔𝑟𝑝!" =  ∝!+ 𝛽!𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑔𝑟𝑝!"! + 𝛽!𝑋!"! + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅! + 𝜀!"   
 
Model 1 tests for CO2 emission per GRP by depending on budgetary variables, which are 
separately tested for revenues, expenditures and deficits. The control variables form a matrix (𝑋!"! ) including GRP per capita, squared GRP per capita, investment ratio in fixed assets to 
GRP, passenger and freight traffic per GRP, human capital per capita and ratio of secondary 
industry to GRP.  
Model 1 includes fixed effect variable (∝!) that account for cross-section specific factors 
between provinces that are permanent over time. For instance, there exist major geographical 
differences in terms of climate and temperature between the south and north of China, which 
affect energy consumption but do not depend on time. The second fixed effect variable 
(𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!) accounts for changes between years that affect all provinces equally, such as fiscal 
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policies and new environmental regulations. Finally, the error term 𝜀!"  accounts for the 
unexplainable variation in CO2 emissions per GRP.  	  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents an overview of key statistics characteristics for each included 
variable in the model. The sample consists of 390 observations divided into 30 provinces on a 
yearly base between 2003 and 2015.  
 
The descriptive statistics in table 1 summarizes the mean, minimum and maximum values as 
well as standard deviations for each variable. Observations show large variation between 
minimum and maximum values for both dependent and independent variables, which is an 
indication of inter-provincial diversity. When looking at detailed descriptive statistics, 
variation is overall higher between provinces than within a province over time.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
     CO2 per GRP 390 0,3064 0,2321 0,0258 1,3761 
      Independent variables 
     Revenue per GRP 390 0,0937 0,0313 0,0481 0,2197 
Expenditure per GRP 390 0,2005 0,0900 0,0792 0,6269 
Deficit per GRP 390 0,1068 0,0839 0,0084 0,5163 
      Control variables 
     GRP per Capita 390 28,4214 19,6537 3,6856 99,1895 
Sq GRP per Capita 390 1193052 1695598 13583,89 9838559 
Investment per GRP 390 0,6201 0,2129 0,2529 1,3283 
Human Capital 390 0,0159 0,0065 0,0039 0,0357 
Passenger Traffic per GRP  390 0,0750 0,0410 0,0092 0,1885 
Freight Traffic per GRP  390 0,3726 0,4180 0,0419 4,1777 
Secondary Industry per GRP 390 0,4688 0,0772 0,1974 0,5905 
 
When computing the averages of CO2 intensity between 2003-2015, we find that provinces in 
north China emit more CO2 per GRP than in the southern provinces. This is illustrated in 
figure 2 below. One exception is Guizhou, which counts as one of China’s poorest provinces 
and is financially more constrained to reduce environment pollution relative to its neighbours. 
The right part in figure 2 excludes China’s five autonomous regions, which are Xinjiang, 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi and Tibet. Even though these provinces are relatively 
	  	   23	  
more self-governed, they receive special financial support from central government (Lai, 
2009). Still, the pattern of excluding autonomous regions remains similar to including all 30 
provinces.  
 
     
Figure 2 CO2 per GRP on average 2003-2015 
Moving to the revenue side, the north-south diversity is less clear as figure 3 illustrates. The 
ratio of revenues to GRP is relatively high for both rich and poor provinces such as Beijing 
and Guizhou. The pattern remains the same when excluding autonomous regions. This 
indicates that even poor provinces with low GRP per capita set relatively high tax rates in 
relation to the size of their economy. Thus, it seems that revenues per GRP is not fully 
determined by the GRP per capita, except for Beijing and Shanghai which represent the 
highest revenues per GRP. 
 
    
Figure 3 Revenues per GRP on average 2003-2015 
Expenditure per GRP is more prominent among poorer provinces in the north and west as 
figure 4 illustrates. It is worth noting that both Shanghai and Beijing have relatively low 
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expenditures per GRP. Furthermore, the variation in expenditure intensity between provinces 
is larger than variation in revenue intensity. Therefore, the high share of expenditures to GRP 
among the poorer provinces deviates somewhat from their relatively low revenue shares in 
figure 3. This confirms that poor provinces in the northwest and southwest are more fiscally 
constrained than others and experience higher ratio deficits.  
 
    
Figure 4 Expenditures per GRP on average 2003-2015 
The pattern of deficits illustrated in figure 5 is similar to the provincial diversity of 
expenditures laid out above. East-coastal regions reveal the smallest deficit ratio and the gap 
between the most and the least fiscally constrained province is considerably higher for deficits 
than for revenues and expenditures.   
 
    
Figure 5 Deficits per GRP on average 2003-2015 
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Overall, the data illustrated in figure 2-5 confirm the existence of fiscal diversity across south, 
north, coastal and non-coastal regions. Apart from a few exceptions, high CO2 intensity and 
budget expenditure ratios dominate in the north and southwest regions while revenue ratios 
are more equally spread across all provinces. Furthermore, the gap in public expenditures 
between provinces is greater than the gap in revenues. Poor provinces rely more on loans, 
which adds to their budget deficits. Just because a province is poor does not mean that their 
budget expenditure as a share of GRP is small, but rather that revenues per capita are 
inadequate to finance public service. The exclusion of autonomous regions in figure 2-5 only 
decreases the provincial gap for CO2 intensity because Ningxia has the highest CO2 intensity 
on average. Figure 6 illustrates how budget deficits correlate with CO2 intensity. It compares 
the difference between including and excluding autonomous regions by exhibiting slightly 
higher R-squared values for including autonomous regions when fitting a trend line. Thus, we 
choose to include autonomous regions in the econometric testing. 
 
Figure 6 CO2 per GRP and Budget Deficit per GRP (left) R-Squared value: 0.29.  
The right figure excludes autonomous regions: R-Squared value: 0.24.  
All data are average values between 2003-2015. 
 
 
4.3 Econometric testing 
Before performing regression analysis on the variables, the study first controls the data 
through various tests to detect whether the set is biased.   
 
Test for stationarity 
For a variable to be stationary, the mean, variance and covariance of the distributed data have 
to be constant over time (Enders, 2015). If not, regression results risk being spurious. Using 
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time-series data often implies risk of non-stationarity. The study performs Lewin-Lin-Chu 
(LLC) unit-root tests for each variable and accounts for trend effect, which are presented in 
Appendix 2. The test detects non-stationarity for passenger traffic per GRP and share of 
secondary industry. First-difference variables are constructed for the two non-stationary 
variables, which then both become stationary. The LLC test results are significant for all 
remaining variables and the study thus rejects the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity.  
 
Multicollinearity 
After transforming non-stationary variables into stationary processes, this thesis test for 
multicollinearity, which detects problems of unreliable regression estimates by measuring the 
linear relationship between the independent variables (Verbeek, 2012). Because this study 
regress fiscal deficits separately from revenues and expenditures, it means that one can ignore 
the multi-correlation between the concerned variables. However, the test results indicate high 
multi-correlation between GRP per capita and squared GRP per capita (coefficient=0.95). 
Therefore, the study chooses to drop out the latter from the model. Correlations between the 
remaining variables are sufficiently low. Test statistics with correlogram and variance 
inflation factors are provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Choice of econometric model 
After controlling for stationarity and multicollinearity, the study performs a Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) test to determine which of the estimators, random effect or 
pooled OLS that fits best into the data. The test is significant and the study therefore rules out 
the pooled OLS estimator. However, when performing a Hausman test to determine which of 
the random or fixed effects that fits best into the data, the test is unable to compute positive P-
values. However, comparison of results between random effects and fixed effects reveals 
similar statistical and economic significance between the dependent and main independent 
variables. Because this thesis assumes heterogeneity to exist both on the cross-sectional level 
and over time periods suggests using fixed effects to be the most appropriate estimator. Thus, 
the study regress the variables by using a fixed effect model, also called within-estimator. 
 
4.4 Benchmark Results 
The results of the benchmark model are divided into four subgroups of which the first 
three show separate results for revenues, expenditures and deficits and the fourth subgroup 
includes both revenues and expenditures.  
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Table 2 Benchmark Results  
 
Model 1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp 
Revenue grp 0.492 
  
1.048** 
 
(0.448) 
  
(0.518) 
Expenditure grp 
 
-0.192 
 
-0.377** 
  
(0.155) 
 
(0.179) 
Deficit grp 
  
-0.327* 
 
   
(0.176) 
  GRP pc -0.0030*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0032*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Invest grp -0.187*** -0.134*** -0.122** -0.141*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0504) (0.0487) (0.0503) 
P.Traffic grp -0.0502 -0.133 -0.126 -0.0648 
 
(0.509) (0.507) (0.505) (0.506) 
F.Traffic grp -0.0002 0.0006 0.0021 0.0035 
 
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
H.Capital pc -9.790*** -9.773*** -9.951*** -10.19*** 
 
(2.553) (2.550) (2.546) (2.546) 
Sec.Industry grp 0.214 0.181 0.159 0.153 
 
(0.267) (0.268) (0.267) (0.267) 
Constant 0.620*** 0.656*** 0.652*** 0.624*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0294) (0.0275) (0.0331) 
Observations 360 360 360 360 
R-squared 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model uses fixed effects for cross-provincial and time-series specific effects. 
All variables are computed as absolute share values except for passenger traffic  
per GRP and secondary industry share of GRP which are first-difference values.  
 
The results in table 2 reveal several crucial aspects. Data in model 1 is based on absolute 
ratios and the interpretation of coefficients varies depending on which of the explanatory 
variables that are significant. The coefficient values equal the changes in number of CO2 
emission kilos per GRP as the independent variable changes by one unit. Starting with 
revenues, the benchmark test exhibits no significant correlation between revenues and CO2 
emission intensity. The same answer holds for expenditures. Of the three separately tested 
budgetary variables, only budget deficit per GRP reveals a significant negative correlation 
with CO2 intensity. This result contradicts the hypothesis because the study argues co-
variation between deficits and CO2 emissions to be positive but the results state that provinces 
with higher ratio of fiscal deficits to GRP during 2003-2015 have lower CO2 intensity. 
Looking at column 4 in table 2, the test results reveal a positive effect between revenues and 
CO2 intensity and a negative effect for expenditures when the two variables are both included. 
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More precisely, one percentage unit increase in the share of revenues to GRP correlates with 
1.048 kilos increase in CO2 emission per GRP. This result also rejects our first hypothesis. 
One potential reason that explains the biased result relates to the lagged effect between 
revenues and emissions. In order to invest in environmental protection, local governments 
first need to collect sufficient tax revenues to finance such an investment. However, the 
negative co-variation between expenditures and CO2 intensity confirms our second hypothesis 
that provinces with high expenditure levels to GRP spend more on environmental protection, 
which improves CO2 intensity. 
Moving on the effects of the control variables; GRP per capita is negatively associated 
with CO2 intensity for all tests in model 1. This suggests provinces with high GRP to have 
lower CO2 intensity. The negative co-variation indicates that CO2 emissions in China have 
started to decouple from GDP and might have reached the EKC emission peak where higher 
GDP leads to lower emission levels. Furthermore, model 1 reveals that both investment ratio 
and human capital correlates negatively with CO2 intensity. These go in the same direction as 
the expectations that we stated in the section for control variables. Finally, the R-squared 
values state that the model explains around 60 percent of the variation in CO2 emissions, 
which we consider to be relatively high.  
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
Because the results in the benchmark model reject the first and third hypothesis but confirm 
the second hypothesis, the study further search to find out whether the benchmark results are 
reliable by applying several robustness tests.  
 
Dynamic model 
First, we construct a dynamic model that accounts for lagged effects of the budgetary 
independent variables. For instance, the share of revenue to GRP in one year likely affects 
policy actions and amount of investments the next year. Similarly, if expenditures in 
environmental technologies are high during one year, we expect that they effect energy 
consumption in the second year. The relationship for the lagged independent variables 
interprets as the one percentage unit change in budgetary share of GRP from last year that 
affects CO2 intensity for this year. The dynamic model has the following formula.  
 2         𝐶𝑂!𝑔𝑟𝑝!" =  ∝!+ 𝛽!𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑔𝑟𝑝!"! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑔𝑟𝑝!"!!! +  𝛽!𝑋!"! + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅! + 𝜀!"   
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Table 3 Results of Dynamic Estimates 
 
Model 2 
 
(5) (6) 
Dep. Variable CO2 grp CO2 grp 
Revenue grp 2.376*** 
 
 
(0.740) 
 lag Revenue grp -1.915**  
 (0.794)  
Expenditure grp -0.366  
 
(0.300) 
 lag Expenditure grp -0.0176  
 (0.311)  
Deficit grp  -0.377 
  (0.303) 
lag Deficit grp  0.0633 
  (0.310) 
 GRP pc -0.0027*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Invest grp -0.125** -0.125** 
 (0.0516) (0.0508) 
P.Traffic grp -0.0656 -0.111 
 (0.507) (0.511) 
F.Traffic grp 0.0035 0.0020 
 (0.0154) (0.0156) 
H.Capital pc -10.12*** -9.919*** 
 (2.534) (2.555) 
Sec.Industry grp 0.0981 0.144 
 (0.276) (0.278) 
Constant 0.648*** 0.652*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0276) 
Observations 360 360 
R-squared 0.61 0.60 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model uses fixed effects for cross-provincial and time-series specific effects. 
All variables are computed as absolute share of values except for passenger traffic  
per GRP and secondary industry share of GRP which are first-difference values.  
 
Results for dynamic effects in table 3 above still state significant positive association between 
revenues and CO2 intensity when regressed for the same year. However, lagged revenues 
covariates negatively with CO2 intensity, which indicates that our first hypothesis to some 
extent is true. In other words, provinces with higher ratio of revenues to GRP the last year 
have lower CO2 intensity this year. The dynamic model reveals no significant effect for 
lagged expenditures and deficits. The remaining significant results for control variables in the 
dynamic model add robustness to the results in the benchmark model.  
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Models excluding municipalities and autonomous regions 
Due to the fact that the benchmark model does not account for cross-provincial trade of 
energy sources, this study suspects municipalities to import electricity that are produced in 
other provinces. Therefore, the thesis perform one robustness test where excluding all 
municipalities (model 3) and another where excluding autonomous regions (model 4). The 
municipalities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The autonomous regions 
are Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Guangxi.  
 
Table 4  Results excluding Municipalities and Autonomous Regions 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Variable CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp 
Revenue grp 1.315**  0.558  
 
(0.632)  (0.509)  
Expenditure grp -0.368*  -0.254  
 
(0.190)  (0.177)  
Deficit grp  -0.317*  -0.233 
 
 (0.188)  (0.174) 
 GRP pc -0.0024*** -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0021*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.000565) (0.0004) 
Invest grp -0.126** -0.0926* -0.253*** -0.246*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0543) (0.0506) (0.0495) 
P.Traffic grp -0.287 -0.317 0.199 0.174 
 
(0.570) (0.572) (0.516) (0.514) 
F.Traffic grp 0.169** 0.159** 0.0078 0.0073 
 
(0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
H.Capital pc -15.60*** -14.15*** -5.102** -4.901* 
 
(3.716) (3.621) (2.512) (2.492) 
Sec.Industry grp 0.0893 0.103 0.234 0.241 
 
(0.307) (0.308) (0.269) (0.269) 
Constant 0.606*** 0.634*** 0.572*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.0426) (0.0392) (0.0330) (0.0280) 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model 3 excludes municipalities. Model 4 excludes autonomous regions.   
The models use fixed effects for cross-provincial and time-series specific effects. 
All variables are computed as absolute share of values except for passenger traffic  
per GRP and secondary industry share of GRP which are first-difference values.  
 
When excluding autonomous regions, the results exhibit no significant co-variation between 
budgetary variables and CO2 intensity. However, results excluding municipalities reveal 
similar pattern to the results in the benchmark model and therefore confirm rejection of the 
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first and third hypothesis and confirmation of the second hypothesis. Effects of control 
variables also remain robust.  
 
Models with subgroups of high- and low GRP and control for urban population  
Apart from being dependent on imports of electricity, municipalities also have relatively high 
GRP per capita. Because results of excluded municipalities are significant lead this study to 
suspect that regions with high GRP per capita more likely reveals significant results. The 
study performs regional tests by dividing provinces into groups of low- and high GRP. Most 
rich provinces situates along the east-coastal areas. The separate tests for rich and poor 
regions indicate whether relationship is similar independent of development stage. The thesis 
assumes that all rich provinces have relatively high budgetary revenues as well as more 
sophisticated production technologies, while poor provinces have lower budgetary revenues 
but higher share of secondary industries. Appendix 4 outlays the division of rich and poor 
provinces.  
 
The control for urbanization is defined as the urban ratio of population. This variable is 
included because the cross-provincial and time series fixed effects do not capture changes in 
urbanization since it varies both over time and between provinces simultaneously. Provinces 
with higher ratio of urban population suppose to covariate negatively with CO2 intensity due 
to their more advanced production technologies. Note that model 6 only covers years between 
2005-2015 and therefore have less observation compared to the benchmark model.  
 
Results in table 5 below exhibit positive co-variation between revenues and CO2 intensity 
only for poor provinces and not for rich. This is an important finding because it concentrates 
the effect among poor provinces. Note also that the coefficient value of revenues for poor 
provinces in model 5 is higher than in the benchmark model, meaning that changes in revenue 
share affects poor provinces more than provinces overall. When controlling for share of urban 
population, the results in model 6 of budgetary variables confirm those in the benchmark 
model. Even though model 6 indicates that highly urbanized provinces have lower CO2 
intensity, the coefficient values for budgetary variables remains almost the same as in the 
benchmark model.      
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Table 5 Results of Separating Rich and Poor Provinces 
 
Poor provinces Rich provinces Urbanization 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) 
Dep. Variable CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp CO2grp 
Revenue grp 2.082** 0.638 1.266*** 
 
 
(0.869) (0.724) (0.445) 
 Expenditure grp -0.312 0.0965 -0.376** 
 
 
(0.235) (0.501) (0.163) 
 Deficit grp 
   
-0.339** 
    
(0.163) 
Urban share 
  
-0.498* -0.517* 
   
(0.282) (0.284) 
 GRP pc -0.0052** -0.0035*** -0.0025*** -0.0018*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Invest grp -0.0434 -0.155*** -0.0655 -0.0319 
 
(0.0914) (0.0560) (0.0495) (0.0475) 
P.Traffic grp -0.557 -0.00965 -0.158 -0.248 
 
(0.804) (0.543) (0.479) (0.481) 
F.Traffic grp 0.221** -0.00818 0.00346 0.00157 
 
(0.0882) (0.0114) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
H.Capital pc -20.50*** -5.497** -10.96*** -10.68*** 
 
(5.551) (2.343) (3.085) (3.106) 
Sec.Industry grp -0.0458 0.346 -0.0141 0.000894 
 
(0.413) (0.316) (0.220) (0.222) 
Constant 0.578*** 0.496*** 0.801*** 0.846*** 
 
(0.0627) (0.0409) (0.0975) (0.0962) 
Observations 180 180 300 300 
R-squared 0.59 0.72 0.65 0.64 
No. of provinces 15 15 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models use fixed effects for cross-provincial and time-series specific effects. 
All variables are computed as absolute share of values except for passenger traffic  
per capita and secondary industry share of GRP which are first-difference values.  
 
Model for growth changes  
All performed robustness tests so far confirm the results in the benchmark model. That is, the 
study rejects the first and third hypothesis while confirming the second hypothesis. However, 
because production technologies improve over time, the thesis suggests that CO2 intensity 
also decreases over time. At the same time, the ratio of fiscal budget revenues and 
expenditures to gross domestic product has regained power since the implementation of TSS. 
Therefore, the study performs a final robustness test by comparing how the growth rates of 
CO2 intensity and budgetary variables covariate with the following model. 
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7         ∆  ln  (𝐶𝑂!𝑔𝑟𝑝)!" =  ∝!+ 𝛽!∆  ln  (𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑔𝑟𝑝!)!" + 𝛽!∆  ln(𝑋𝑝𝑐!)!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅! + 𝜀!"   
 
To simplify the interpretation of values, the growth model uses natural logarithmic values for 
all variables. Since all values are computed as first-differences, the interpretation is the 
change of percentage units in growth. The remaining features in the growth model are the 
same as the benchmark model.  
 
Table 6 Results of Growth Changes 
 
Model 7 
 
(15) (16) (17) (18) 
Dep. Variable ∆ln(CO2grp) ∆ln(CO2grp ∆ln(CO2grp ∆ln(CO2grp 
Revenue grp 0.165* 
  
0.157 
 
(0.0908) 
  
(0.0983) 
Expenditure grp 
 
0.0794 
 
0.0200 
  
(0.0908) 
 
(0.0979) 
Deficit grp 
  
0.00567 
 
   
(0.0307) 
  GRP pc -0.728*** -0.685*** -0.669*** -0.729*** 
 
(0.119) (0.117) (0.116) (0.120) 
Invest grp -0.0362 -0.0273 -0.0101 -0.0398 
 
(0.0681) (0.0702) (0.0678) (0.0704) 
P.Traffic grp 0.0603 0.0605 0.0657 0.0593 
 
(0.0447) (0.0452) (0.0448) (0.0451) 
F.Traffic grp 0.0073 0.0058 0.0075 0.0069 
 
(0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
H.Capital pc 0.627*** 0.617*** 0.612*** 0.627*** 
 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Sec.Industry grp 0.371** 0.395** 0.367** 0.378** 
 
(0.176) (0.179) (0.177) (0.179) 
Constant -0.0185 -0.0201 -0.0191 -0.0189 
 
(0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0185) 
Observations 360 360 360 360 
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model uses fixed effects for cross-provincial and time-series specific effects. 
All variables are computed as first-difference of the natural logarithm values. 
 
Test results of the growth model (7) above reveal significant correlation only for growth 
changes in budgetary revenues. The positive coefficient signifies that one percentage unit 
increase in revenue share of GRP associates with 0.17 percentage unit increase in growth of 
CO2 intensity. Thus, not only absolute revenue rates but also the changes in revenue growth 
covariates positively with CO2 intensity. This result further confirms rejection of the first 
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hypothesis. The results for growth in expenditures and deficits in model 7 are insignificant 
and do not add robustness to the significant results found in the benchmark model regarding 
the second and the third hypothesis.    
4.6 Discussion of results 
Apart from the dynamic model, significant results for all other models presented above 
resolutely reject the first hypothesis that provinces with lower budget revenues per GRP have 
higher CO2 intensity. In fact, the results indicate a positive relationship and that the effect is 
more prominent among poor provinces. This states that richer provinces to a less extent 
depend on their fiscal situation for improving CO2 intensity. The effect of a large private 
sector may contribute to the efforts of improving environmental quality. Poor provinces do 
not necessarily improve their fiscal situation by increasing their budget revenues to GRP 
because such change can relate to lower GRP growth rather than a major increase in the fiscal 
tax base. Interestingly, the dynamic model reveals negative correlation between budget 
revenues and CO2 emission levels. Thus, the overall result is mixed depending on whether the 
relationship is dynamic or not and indicates that provinces with higher revenue share will 
improve their CO2 intensity in the future but increase the intensity at the present. It is 
reasonable to assume that for increasing fiscal revenues to have an effect on environmental 
quality by investing will require a certain period of time. In sum, results in the short run 
suggest rejecting the first hypothesis but the effects in the long run still support the first 
hypothesis. 
 
The negative correlation between expenditures and CO2 emissions is robust for several tests 
and confirms the second hypothesis that provinces with higher expenditure shares of GRP are 
less CO2 intensive. However, the negative correlation between deficits and CO2 emissions not 
only lead to reject the third hypothesis but also contradicts the theory laid out in chapter 2 and 
3 that fiscally constrained provinces invest less in environmental protection and lax 
environmental standards. As opposed to budget revenues, the budget deficits revealed no 
significant reverse correlation when including the previous time period. Therefore, this study 
rules out that provinces with high deficit ratio will contribute to higher CO2 intensity in the 
future.  
 
Overall, the interpretations of the budgetary variables in relation to the theory of fiscal 
federalism vary depending on how one defines fiscally constrained provinces. The theory 
states that poor provinces with smaller tax base are fiscally more constrained. However, the 
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data show that some poor provinces still have a moderate fiscal revenue size to their GRP. In 
fact, the fiscal proxies utilized in this study have several weak properties: First, the budgetary 
revenues and expenditures exclude off-budgetary taxes and spending. The off-budgetary 
finances distort the clearness of a province’s actual fiscal situation. Second, the budgetary 
variables leave out central-to-local transfers, which have increased over time and become 
vital for poor provinces to finance public services and environmental investments. Therefore, 
the results from this chapter should be interpreted with carefulness due to their limited 
explanation of causal relationships and risk of being misinterpreted.   
5. Conclusion 
While the decentralization of fiscal authorities in China has contributed substantially to 
the economic growth, it has also led to large fiscal disparities between SNGs. Due to the inter-
jurisdictional competition for mobile capital, provinces that loose the competition race end up 
with unsustainable high budget deficits. The argument is that poor provinces becomes 
financially constrained which lowers their ability to invest in environmental protection and 
may lead their political leaders to act strategically in setting environmental stringencies that 
counteract improvements of environmental quality. This study attempted to examine the fiscal 
and environmental diversities in China by studying the relationship between budgetary size 
and CO2 emissions on provincial level. Based on the established theory about decentralized 
fiscal management and public concerns for environmental protection, the study argues that 
crucial components of the theory rely on weak assumptions and that the risk of local leaders 
to act discretionary is especially prominent among poor governments. To measure the fiscal 
circumstances of SNGs, this study hypothesized that provinces with low shares of revenues 
and expenditures to GRP or high shares of deficits to GRP have higher CO2 intensity.   
 
The empirical results show that higher expenditures ratios correlate with lower CO2 
intensity. However, the study also finds that higher ratios of revenues associate with higher 
CO2 intensity the same year but lower CO2 intensity the next year. One robustness test 
confirms that the effect is concentrated among poor provinces. Most contradictory, the results 
for ratio of budget deficits reveal negative effect on CO2 intensity. Thus, the findings both 
reject and confirm that provinces with relatively low revenues and expenditures or high 
deficits are more CO2 intensive than other provinces. The results are also constrained by the 
unsureness of CO2 emission spillover effects between provinces. 
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From	  a	  broader	  perspective,	  the results of budget revenues confirm to some extent the 
theory that rich provinces compete for mobile capital by lowering their tax rates while poor 
provinces react by raising their tax rates, as stated by Yang and Zhang (2008). Provinces still 
race to the bottom when competing for mobile capital and set their environmental stringency 
accordingly but the race is reflected through other factors, such as GDP growth, rather than 
the revenue ratio to GRP. Provincial governments excessively use off-budgetary sources of 
finance and rely on central-to-local transfers (Wang, 2012). This might explain why the 
results of deficits contradict the theory about lower environmental stringency among fiscally 
constrained governments, because transfers and off-budgetary sources biases both the 
officially stated fiscal situation and deviates from the theory of self-responsible fiscal 
management under hard budget constraints.  
 
Nevertheless, empirical results of this study still do not rule out the negative relationship 
between fiscally constrained provinces and higher CO2 emissions. It is likely that fiscal 
federalism has strengthened the attempt to reduce CO2 emissions nationally because the 
overall share of public expenditures to GDP has increased over time. However, the sub-
national effects of fiscal decentralization on CO2 emissions based on the fiscal and 
environmental diversities remain to some extent unclear. The fact that fiscal federalism 
improves local fiscal management but that poor local governments still rely on central 
transfers means that decentralization in China both incentivizes and at the same time 
disincentivizes the local governments to manage environmental protection.  
 
Finally, in order to relate the theory of a fiscal race to the bottom with changes in CO2 
intensity, the fiscally constrained provinces cannot be reflected only by the ratio of budget 
aggregative revenues, expenditures and deficits to GRP. This is one major limitation of this 
study and suggests further research to control for transfers and off-budgetary revenues and 
expenditures in order to better isolate the effects of the fiscal sizes. Another aspect worth 
considering is to examine the effects from shares of environmental investments or pollution 
fees. The results could further be improved by expanding the time-period of data and 
elaborating with alternative methods of normalization. The study leaves these suggestions for 
future research.  
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Appendix 1.   
a) Components of budget revenues: 
Business tax, profit handed in by the local enterprises, city maintenance and construct tax, 
house property tax, urban land use tax, land appreciation tax, tax on vehicles and boat 
operation, farm land occupation tax, deed tax, and tobacco leaf tax, stamp tax, 25% of the 
value added tax, 40% the share part of the corporate income tax, 40% of individual income 
tax, 3% of stamp tax on securities transactions, resource tax other than the tax on offshore 
petroleum resources, local non-tax revenue, etc 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 
b) Components of budget expenditures: 
Main expenditures for general public services, expenditure for public security, and 
expenditures for social development which are planed by local governments, etc 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 
 
Appendix 2. 
LLC	  unit	  root	  tests	  Model	  1:	  
 
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) 
 
Level First Difference 
Variable t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
CO2 per GRP -3.7483 0.0001 - - 
Revenue per GRP -2.5594 0.0052 - - 
Expenditure per GRP -5.6570 0.0000 - - 
Deficit per GRP -6.5531 0.0000 - - 
GRP per Capita -4.6674 0.0000 - - 
Sq GRP per Capita -7.5689 0.0000 - - 
Investment per GRP -5.9928 0.0000 - - 
Human Capital 0.9637 0.8324 -3.9213 0.0000 
Passenger Traffic -4.0764 0.0000 - - 
Freight Traffic -11.9006 0.0000 - - 
Secondary Industry 1.0019 0.8418 -5.0633 0.0000 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots.  
Notes: All tests include panel means and time trends.  
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Appendix 3. 
Variance	  Inflation	  Factor	  (VIF)	  for	  Model	  1:	  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
GRP pc 3.13 0.319269 
Revenue per GRP 3.07 0.325417 
Expenditure per GRP 2.83 0.353479 
Human capital pc 2.47 0.405239 
Investment per GRP 2.02 0.494061 
Sec. industry per GRP D1. 1.43 0.699690 
Freight traffic per GRP 1.16 0.862350 
Passenger traffic per GRP D1. 1.05 0.954908 
Mean VIF 2.15 
 	  	  
Correlogram	  Model	  1:	  
 
CO2 Revenue Expend. Deficits GRPpc Invest. Passanger  traffic D1. 
Freight 
traffic 
Human 
capital 
Sec.industry 
D1. 
CO2 1.0000 
         
Revenue -0.2451 1.0000 
        
Expenditure 0.1708 0.3426 1.0000 
       
Deficits 0.2713 -0.0008 0.9392 1.0000 
      
GRPpc -0.4526 0.6824 -0.0687 -0.3225 1.0000 
     
Investment 0.0324 0.1243 0.6065 0.6002 0.0237 1.0000 
    
Pass. traffic D1. 0.0048 0.0251 -0.0981 -0.1136 0.0887 -0.1647 1.0000 
   
Freight traffic 0.0663 0.0957 -0.0831 -0.1234 0.0774 -0.1533 0.0909 1.0000 
  
Human capital -0.4108 0.4927 -0.2110 -0.4046 0.6820 0.0325 0.0272 0.2613 1.0000 
 
Sec.industry D1. 0.2295 -0.4145 -0.1856 -0.0460 -0.4613 -0.2785 -0.0180 0.0581 -0.3296 1.0000 
 
          
Appendix 4. 
Subgroups of provinces: 
Rich Provinces 
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, Tianjian, Beijing, 
Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Hubei, Chongqing, Jilin 
 
Poor Provinces 
Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Qinghai, Hainan 
 
